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Abstract
We present a multi-modal action logic with first-order modalities, which con-
tain terms which can be unified with the terms inside the subsequent formulas and
which can be quantified. This makes it possible to handle simultaneously time
and states. We discuss applications of this language to action theory where it is
possible to express many temporal aspects of actions, as for example, beginning,
end, time points, delayed preconditions and results, duration and many others. We
present tableaux rules for a decidable fragment of this logic.
1 Introduction
Most action theories consider actions being specified by their preconditions and their
results. The temporal structure of an action system is then defined by the sequence
of actions that occur. A world is conceived as a graph of situations where every link
from one node to the next node is considered as an action transition. This yields also a
temporal structure of the action space, namely sequences of actions can be considered
defining sequences of world states. The action occurs instantantly at one moment and
its results are true at the “next” moment.
However, the temporal structure of actions can be much more complex and com-
plicated.
• Actions may have a duration.
• The results may be true before the action is completed or after it is finished.
• Actions may have preconditions which have to have been true during some in-
terval preceding the action occurrence.
In order to represent complex temporal structures, underlying actions’ occurrences,
we have developed an action logic which allows to handle both states and time simul-
tanuously.
We want to be able to express, for instance that action a occurs at moment t if
conditions p1, . . .pn have been true during the intervals i1, . . . all preceding t.
Here we present an approach where it is possible to represent actions in a complex
temporal environment. In reality, actions have sometimes a beginning time, a duration,
preconditions which may also have temporal aspects ; and the results may be true only
instances after the end of the action performance. For an example, consider the action
of calling an elevator, taking place at instance t1. Depending on the actual situation
this action may cause the elevator to move only many instances later, to stop still later,
an so on. The action of pressing the button of a traffic light, in order to get green light
to traverse the street may result in a switch immediately or after some seconds and in
another switch after some more minutes.
In order to represent such issues, we define a modal action logic, where the modal-
ities are terms containing variables which can be quantified. The same variables can
occur inside the modalities as well as in the formulas after the modalities, allowing for
unification between action term components and logical terms. This language makes it
possible to express reasoning on states and the action terms allow to express temporal
aspects of the actions.
2 The first-order modal action logic Dal
The language of first-order action logic, L is an extension of the language of classical
predicate logic, L0. L0 consists of a set of variables x, y, x1, y1, . . ., a set F of function
symbols F , where |F | ∈ ω is the arity of F , a set P of predicate symbols P , including
⊤ and ⊥, where |P | ∈ ω is the arity of P , an equality symbol =, the logical symbols
¬, ∧ ,∀. Terms and formulas are defined as usual and so are ∃ and ∨. We denote by
Vt the set of all terms of L0. If φ is a formula and x a variable then we say that x is
bounded in φ, when it occurs in a subformula ∀xφ. x occurs free in φ if it occurs in φ
and is not bounded in φ.
Action terms The language for action operators consists of
• a set A of action symbols a1, a2, . . . where |a| ∈ ω is the arity of a and such that
A ∩ P = ∅
Action terms are built from action symbols and terms of L0.
• if a is an action symbol of arity n and t1, . . . tn are terms of L0, then a(t1, . . . tn)
is an action term.
An action term is called grounded if no variable occurs free in it. The set of grounded
action terms is denoted by At.
Action operators If a and a1, a2, . . . an are action terms, then
• [a] is an action operator
• [a1; a2; . . . an] is an action operator
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Modal operator 2 is the standard modal operator ( S4 )
For n = 0, the corresponding action operator is noted [ε].
An action operator is called grounded if all the action terms occurring in it are
grounded.
Example: [a], [a(c1, c2, c3)] are grounded, [a(x, c2, y)] is not grounded.
Action formulas
• If φ is a first-order formula and [A] is an action operator, then [A]φ is an action
formula.
• If φ is a first-order formula and 2 is the modal operator, then 2φ is an action
formula.
• If φ is an action formula and x is a variable, then ∀xφ is an action formula.
Instantiation If φ is a formula and t is a term, then φxt is the formula obtained from
φ by replacing every free occurrence of x by t. If t is the name of an element of a set
O then φxt is called O-instance of φ.
Example:
[a(x, c)](¬φ(c, x) ∨ ψ(x))xc1 = [a(c1, c)](¬φ(c, c1) ∨ ψ(c1))
[a1; a2; a3(c, y)]P (c, y)
y
c3
= [a1; a2; a3(c, c3)]P (c, c3)
A formula is called grounded if there is no variable occurring free in it.
2.1 Semantical Characterization of Dal
A Dal structure is defined as a Kripke-type structure, such that the transition relation
between worlds depends on grounded action terms.
A Dal structure is a tupleM = (W , {Sw : w ∈ W},A,R, τ), where
• W is a set of worlds
• for every w ∈ W , Sw = (O,Fw,Pw) is a classical structure, whereO is the set
of individual objects (the same set in all worlds), Fw is a set of functions overO
and Pw is a set of predicates overO.
• A is a set of action functions, for f ∈ A, f :W×O× . . .×O︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
−→ 2W , n ∈ ω.
Action functions will characterize the action operators (every action symbol of
arity n in A will be associeted with an action function of arity n+ 1).
• R ⊆ W ×W is a binary accessability relation on W , which will characterize
the modal operater 2. We will write R(w) = {w′ : (w,w′) ∈ R}.
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• τ is a valuation, τ = (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3), where τ0 is a function assigning objects
from O to terms. In order to speak about objects from O, we introduce into the
language, for every o ∈ O, an o-place function symbol (denoted equally o, for
simplicity).
τ1 is a function assigning, for every world w ∈ W , functions (from F ) to func-
tion symbols (from F ), of the same arity,
τ1 :W ×F −→ F such that |τ1(w,F )| = |F |.
τ2 is a function assigning, for every world w ∈ W , predicates to predicate sym-
bols of the same arities,
τ2 :W ×P −→ P , such that |τ2(w,P )| = |P |.
τ3 is a function assigning action functions to action symbols,
τ3 : A −→ A, such that |τ3(a)| = |a|+ 1
• τ3(a)(w, τ0(t1), . . . , τ0(tn)) ⊆ R(w). If a world can be reached from w by the
execution of action a(t1, t2, . . . , tn) then it is accessible (via the relation R).
τ0, τ1, τ2 and τ3 define the valuation τ as follows:
• If F (t1, t2, . . . , tm) is a term then
τ0(w,F (t1, t2, . . . , tm)) = τ1(w,F )(τ0(w, t1), τ0(w, t2), . . . , τ0(w, tm)).
• if P is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, t2, . . . , tn are free object variables then
τ(w,P t1, t2, . . . , tn) = ⊤ iff (τ0(t1), . . . τ0(tn)) ∈ τ2(w,P )
• τ(w, t1 = t2) = ⊤ iff τ(w, t1) = τ(w, t2)
• τ(w,¬φ) = ⊤ iff τ(w, φ) = ⊥
• τ(w, φ ∧ ψ) = ⊤ iff τ(w, φ) = τ(w,ψ) = ⊤
• τ(w, ∀xφ) = ⊤ iff for every o ∈ O τ(w, φxo ) = ⊤
• τ(w, [a(t1, t2, . . . , tn)]φ) = ⊤ iff for every w′ ∈ τ3(a)(w, τ0(t1), . . . , τ0(tn)),
τ(w′, φ) = ⊤
• τ(w,2φ) = ⊤ iff for every w′ ∈ R(w), τ(w′, φ) = ⊤
Let φ be a formula and x1, x2, . . . , xn be the free object variables occurring in φ.
Then τ(s, φ) = t iff for every tuple t1, t2, . . . , tn of ground terms,
τ(w, φ
x1, x2, . . . , xn
t1, t2, . . . , tn
) = t
A formula φ is called valid in state w ∈ W of aDal -structureM iff τ(w, φ) = ⊤.
This is denoted by M, w |= φ. We also say then that φ is satisfiable. A formula φ
is called valid in a Dal - structure M with the set of states W , iff φ is valid in every
w ∈ W . We denote that by M |= φ. A formula φ is called Dal - valid iff φ is valid
in every Dal - structure. This is denoted by |=Dal φ. We suppress the index Dal ,
whenever it is clear from the context, in which system we are.
Remark 1 [a]⊥ is satisfiable and we have τ(w, [a]⊥) = ⊤ iff
τ3(a)(w, τ0(t1), . . . , τ0(tn)) = ∅
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2.2 Axioms and inference rules of Dal
In addition to the axioms and inference rules of classical first - order logic and those
of the system K , which rule the action operators including [ε], and those of the system
and S4, which rule the operator 2, we have the following axioms and inference rules,




[A4] ∀xα→ αxc for any individual term c of L
[A5] ∀x[X ]α↔ [X ]∀xα for any modal operator X, with no occurrence of x
[R1] From α infer 2α
[R2] From α→ β infer α→ ∀xβ provided x has no free occurrence in α
⊢Dal is defined as usual, such that ⊢Dal φ for any instance φ of one of the
axioms; and ⊢Dal ψ, wheneverψ can be inferred from φ, for any φ, such that ⊢Dal φ
by use of one of the inference rules. Again, we suppress the index Dal , whenever it is
clear from the context, in which system we are.
2.3 Soundness, Completeness, Decidability
The Dal -logic is sound and complete:
Theorem 1 ⊢Dal φ if and only if φ is Dal - valid (|=Dal φ)
The soundness proof is easy and the completeness proof goes along the lines of
completeness proofs for modal logics by construction of a canonical model. The
proof, which can be found in the appendix, bears several modifications according to
the specific language which allows to quantify over terms occurring within modal
operators.
Dal is a first order language and therefore undecidable in the general case. But for
action logics, we will make use of decidable subsets of Dal .
Dal is very close to term modal logic introduced by [1]. Term modal logic al-
lows terms in general as modalities, whereas our action logic only admits action terms.
MoreoverDal contains the S4 modal operator 2 which is not part of term modal logic.
3 Temporal Action Theories
Using Dal , we can modelize temporal aspects of dynamic actions. The modal logic
allows to define action operators as modalities [3, 11]. The first order logic is used to
formulate actions at a more general level. Here, we show an example where in addition
to the relative representation of time by the modal operators, it is possible to express
time points by terms.
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We presuppose a time axis, linearly ordered (dense or continuous or discrete).
Given a Dal -structure, we will define a transitive relation on the set of states, W ,
which will be related to the order on T .
Definition 1 Let M = (W , {Sw : w ∈ W},A,R, (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3)) , be a Dal -model.
Then w ≺0 w′ iff ∃a ∈ A of arity n and there are terms t1, . . . , tn, such that w′ ∈
f(w, t1, . . . , tn). Let be  the reflexive and transitive closure of ≺0.
Intuitively, this means that w ≺ w′ if we can possibly “reach” w′ from w by
performing actions a1, a2, . . . , an. Obviously,  is transitive and reflexive. Since we
want to “link” worlds of W to time points in T , which is ordered, ≺ must also be an-
tisymmetric. The temporal entrenchment of the states is defined by a homomorphism
time : W −→ T from W into T , where w  w′ implies time(w) ≤ time(w′).
Using this construction, actions operators can be defined admitting complex temporal
structures, including beginning and ending instances and a duration, which can be 0,
when the result is immediate, or ∆ ∈ T . The preconditions and results of actions can
be defined to occur at freely determinable time instances before or after the instance
when the action occurs. When an action a occurs in the state w, time(w) gives us the
time point at which a occurs. If the duration of the action is ∆, the time point of the
resulting state w′ is time(w′) = time(w) + ∆.
In this particular framework, we define
• Action terms as binary action predicates a(t, d,−→x ), where t denotes the instance
on which a occurs and d denotes the duration of a, i.e. the interval on T after
which the results of a will hold. , −→x is the sequence of other variables denoting
the other entities or objects involved in the action occurrence.
To give an example, let T = {1, . . . , 24} be discrete and finite, denoting the
hours during one day. Then action move(t, 3, TGV,Marseille, Paris) is the
action “train TGV goes from Marseille to Paris, the duration being 3 hours”.
• Action axioms. An action axiom is characterized by a precondition pi(t,−→x ) and a
result ρ(t+ d,−→x ), where pi and ρ are Dal formulas describing all preconditions
and results of action a.
To continue the previous example, the action execution axiom
of the move-action is at(t, x, y) → [move(t, d, x, y, z)]at(t +
d, x, z) (and can be instantiated to at(6, TGV,Marseille) →
[move(6, 3, TGV,Marseille, Paris)]at(9, TGV, Paris)), which means:
if x is at y at instance t, then, after moving from y to z, x is at z at instance t+d.
The general form of an action law is
pi(t1,−→x1)→ [a(t, d,−→x2)]ρ(t2,−→x3),where −→x1 ∪ −→x2 ⊆ −→x3
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4 Example
The following example is due to Lewis [5] and has been discussed by Halpern and
Pearl in [4] in the framework of a theory of causation. Interestingly, this example
defines actions with a complex temporal structure.
Billy and Suzanne throw rocks at a bottle. Suzanne throws first and her rock arrives
first. The bottle shatters. When Billy’s rock gets to where the bottle used to be, there is
nothing there but flying shards of glass. Without Suzanne’s throw, the impact of Billy’s
rock on the intact bottle would have been one of the final steps in the causal chain from
Billy’s throw to the shattering of the bottle. But, thanks to Suzanne’s preempting throw,
that impact never happens.
In our formulation, we focalize on the temporal structure of the throw action. We
consider that the action occurs along a continuous (or dense) time axis, [0,∞[. We
define one action term for “throw”, T , and two predicates H for “hits” and BB for
“the bottle is broken”. The action term T (t, d, p) means that “person p throws a stone
to a bottle at instance t and the result of the action (the stone hits its target) occurs at
instance t + d”. The formula H(t, p) means that “the stone thrown by person p hits
the bottle at instance t and formulaBB(t) means that the bottle is broken at instance t.
The intended result of the action is to hit the bottle, but this result can only be achieved
if the bottle is still at the intended place and nothing else has been happened to it,
namely if it is not broken in the meantime. In this example it is not enough to have the
precondition that the bottle is there and not broken at the instance of throwing, but it
must be non-broken at the moment when the action is to be completed, just before it
is to be hit. Therefore the action law for “throw” has a precondition which must hold
after the instance when the action occurs.
Example 1 The following set of laws represents the framework of this story:
(1) ¬BB(t+ d)→ [T (t, d, p)]H(t+ d, p)
(2) 2(H(t, p)→ BB(t+ d1))
(3) 2(BB(t)→ ∀t′(t < t′ → BB(t′)))
(4) ¬BB(0)
(1) is the action law for successful execution of the throw action, (2) describes the
impact of hitting the bottle (d1 is infinitesimally small) and the general law (3) says
that a broken bottle remains broken “forever” 1.
Several scenarios can happen within this framework. Here we discuss the scenario
where Suzanne throws at instance 0 and Billy throws some instance later2.
(5) < T (0, ds, suzy) > ⊤
(6) < T (t1, db, billy) > ⊤
1In this example we focus on the temporal relations between the different instances of throwing (by
Suzanne and by Billy), so we neglected other preconditions, as for example having a stone, heavy enough,
but not too heavy, having members enabling the person to throw, seeing the object to aim, etc. The throw
action defined here is highly abstracted for the purpose of our temporal action theory.
2In order to express that action aoccurs, we write [a]⊤, which simply means that action a occurs (even
when nothing can be said about its results). It is always possible to throw a stone at a bottle, even if the
intended result of hitting cannot be achieved.
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We need these “empty results”, because
Three cases can then be distinguished:
1. The moment when the bottle can be hit (and broken) after Suzanne’s throw (ds+
d1) occurs before Billy’s stone could possibly hit the bottle t1 + db.
(7) ds + d1 < t1 + db
(8) 2(BB(ds + d1)→ BB(t1 + db)) from (3) and (7)
(9) ¬BB(ds) by persistency from (4)3
(10) [T (0, ds, suzy)]H(ds, suzy) from (1) and (9)
(11) [T (0, ds, suzy)]BB(ds + d1) from (2), (10), K for the action modality and (A2)
(12) [T (0, ds, suzy)]BB(t1 + db) from (11), (8), K and (A2)
In this scenario, the law ¬BB(t1 + db) → [T (t1, db, billy)]H(t1 + db, billy)
cannot be used to derive T (t1, db, billy)]H(t1+ db, billy) becauseBB(t1 + db)
holds after Suzanne’s throw (12). Billy’s stone cannot hit the bottle, because it
is already broken when his stone could hit it and we have just [T (t1, db, billy)]⊤
((6), Billy has thrown).
2. Billy’s stone hits the bottle, which breaks, before Suzanne’s stone could possibly
hit the bottle.
(13) t1 + db + d1 < ds
(14) 2(BB(t1 + db + d1)→ BB(ds)) from (3) and (13)
(15) ¬BB(t1 + db) by persistency from (4), see (9)
(16) [T (t1, db, billy)]H(t1 + db, billy) from (1) and (15)
(17) [T (t1, db, billy)]BB(t1 + db + d1) from (2), (16), K and (A2)
(18) [T (t1, db, billy)]BB(ds) from (14), (17), K and (A2)
Here, Suzanne’s stone, which could hit the bottle at instance ds, will not hit it
since we haveBB(ds) and therefore the precondition¬BB(ds) is not more true.
The law 2(¬BB(ds)→ [T (0, ds, suzy)]H(ds, suzy)) cannot be used to derive
[T (0, ds, suzy)]H(ds, suzy) becauseBB(t1+db+d1) holds after Billy’s throw
(17). All we have is [T (0, ds, suzy)]⊤ (Suzanne throws).
3. Suzanne’s and Billy’s stone hit the bottle precisely at the same moment.
(19) t1 + db = ds
(20) ¬BB(t1 + db) ∧ ¬BB(ds) by persistency from (4), see (9)
(21) [T (0, ds, suzy)]H(ds, suzy) like (10)
(22) [T (t1, db, billy)]H(t1 + db, billy) as (16)
(23) [T (0, ds, suzy)]BB(ds + d1) from (21)
(24) [T (t1, db, billy)]BB(t1 + dsb+ d1) from (22))
In this case, both stones hit the bottle which breaks as a result of Suzanne’s throw
and Billy’s throw.
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5 Conclusion and Related Work
Modal logic approaches to action theories define a space of states but cannot handle
time, neither explicitly not implicitly [2, 6]. In situation calculus [9, 7] reasoning about
time was not foreseen, properties change discretely and actions do not have durations.
Remember that in situation calculus, there is a starting state, s0 and for any action a
and state s, do(a, s) is a resulting state of s. One can consider that the set of states is
given by {s : ∃a1 . . . ans = do(an, do(an−1, . . . do(a1, s0)))}. Hence the temporal
structure of situation calculus is discrete and branching and does not allow for actions
of different duration neither for preconditions or results which become true during the
action execution or later after the action is ended.
Javier Pinto has extended situation calculus in order to integrate time [8]. He
conserves the framework of situation calculus and introduces a notion of time. In-
tuitively, every situation s has a starting time and an ending time, where end(s, a) =
start(do(a, s)) meaning that situation s ends when the succeeding situation do(a, s) is
reached. The end of the situation s is the same time point as the beginning of the next
situation resulting from the occurrence of action a in s. The obvious asymmetry of the
start and end functions is due to the fact that the situation space has the form of a tree
whose root is the beginning state s0. Thus, every state has a unique preceding state but
eventually more that one succeeding state.
Paolo Tereziani proposes in [12] a system that can handle temporal constraints
between events and temporal constraints between instances of events.
In this present article, we have introduced a new modal logic formalism which can
handle simultaneously states and time. We did not address here the problem of the
persistency of facts over time (or over the execution of actions), because we wanted to
focus on the modal temporal formalism. We have adopted a solution similar to the one
presented in [11], i.e. “weak” frame laws are nonmonotonically added to the theory.
But this solution is a bit more complicated in the case of our first-order action logic
presented in this paper, because we need to restrict ourselves to a decidable subset of
Dal .
Concerning the implementation, we use a labelled analytic tableaux approach in-
cluding an abductive mechanism for the weak persistency laws, which will be described
in more detail in a following paper.
We will apply this formalism to planning problems where a hybrid approach (states
and time) can be very powerful. The idea is to infer temporal constraints from a
Dal specification in order to create a plan for a problem
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A Appendix: Proofs of the theorems
A.1 Soundness and Completeness
Soundness is easy and left tyo the reader. For completeness, in this part we will show
that every Dal - valid formula is a theorem of Dal . Our proof is along the same lines
as [10]. Subsequently, formulas are always grounded.
Definition 2 A set of formulas, s, is called Dal -inconsistent if it contains a finite sub-
set {φ1, φ2, . . . , φk} with ⊢Dal ¬φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬φk . Otherwise s is calledDal - consis-
tent (or consistent).
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Let s be a set of formulas. Then we denote by Vt(s) the set of all terms occurring
in formulas of s. We denote by P (s) the set of all Dal - formulas containing only
nonlogical symbols (terms, action terms and predicate symbols) of formulas of s.
Definition 3 A set of formulas s is called complete (or Dal - complete) if
1. s is consistent.
2. s is maximal, i.e. for all φ in P (s) holds: if φ 6∈ s then s ∪ {φ} is inconsistent.
3. s is saturated, i.e. for every existential formula ∃xφ ∈ s where x is a variable,
there is a formula φxc ∈ s for some constant c ∈ Vt(s).
Lemma 1 Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a complete set of for-
mulas.
Proof Let s be a consistent set of formulas and let c1, c2, . . . be a sequence of ‘new’
object variables not in Vt(s). We define P ⋆(s) = P (s) ∪ {ψ : ψ is a formula with
variables from c1, c2 . . .}. Let {∃xiφi(xi)}i=1,... be an enumeration of all existential
formulas of P*(s). Then we form a new set of formulas s∼, by adding to s all formulas
∃xiφi(xi)→ φ(ai), i = 1, 2, . . . for every existential formula of P (s). It is easy to see
that s∼ is consistent.
s∼ is extended to a complete (maximal) set of formulas s⋆ as follows: Let Θ = {s′ :
s ⊂ s′ and s′ consistent}. Let H be a chain in Θ, i.e. H ⊂ Θ and if s1, s2 ∈ H then
s1 ⊂ s2 or s2 ⊂ s1. Then
⋃
H is an upper bound of H in Θ, since s ⊂ ⋃H for all
s ∈ H . It is easy to see that
⋃
H is consistent. Therefore ⋃H ∈ Θ and, by Zorn’s
Lemma, Θ then has a maximal element, s⋆. It is easy to see that s⋆ is complete.
Q.E.D.
The following properties of complete sets are straightforward.
Lemma 2 Let s be a complete set of formulas. Then
1. φ ∈ s if and only if ¬φ 6∈ s
2. If φ ∈ s and ψ ∈ P (s) and ⊢Dal φ→ ψ then ψ ∈ s
3. If 2φ ∈ s then [a]φ ∈ s
4. If φ ∨ ψ ∈ s then φ ∈ s or ψ ∈ s
5. If φ ∨ ψ ∈ P (s) and φ ∈ s or ψ ∈ s then φ ∨ ψ ∈ s
6. If c ∈ Vt(s), then φxc ∈ s if and only if ∃xφ ∈ s
7. t = t ∈ s for any term t ∈ Vt(s)
8. If t = t′ ∈ s then t′ = t ∈ s
9. If t = t′ ∈ s and t′ = t′′ ∈ s then t = t′′ ∈ s
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The last three items show that t = t′ ∈ s defines an equivalence relation ∼s over
Vt(s), where t ∼s t′ iff t = t′ ∈ s. The equivalence class of t according to ∼s is
denoted by [t]s.
Definition 4 Let s be a set of formulas and a ∈ At. Then we define
1. sa = {φ : [a]φ ∈ s}
2. s2 = {φ : 2φ ∈ s}
Lemma 3 1. sa is inconsistent iff [a]⊥ ∈ s
2. s2 ⊆ sa
Lemma 4 Let s be a complete set of formulas and φ a formula such that sa ∪ {φ} is
consistent. Let s′ = (sa ∪ {φ})∗ the complete extension of sa ∪ {φ} (which exists by
lemma 1). Then Vt(s) = Vt(s′) Proof Since s is complete, it is saturated, hence for
every existential formula ∃xφ ∈ s there is a formula φxc ∈ s for some c ∈ Vt(s). The
crucial point concerns existential formulas in sa not in s. But for those formulas we
have that 2∃xφ ∈ s and therefore ∃xφ ∈ sa, by T . Hence existential formulas in sa
are also existential formulas in s. But this means that all terms in s’ are terma in s.
Q.E.D.
Definition 5 A set S of sets of formulas is called complete if
1. Every element s of S is a complete set of formulas.
2. For all s ∈ S and φ ∈ P (s), if sa ∪ {φ} is consistent, then there is s′ ∈ S such that
sa ∪ {φ} ⊂ s′
Remark 2 If [a]⊥ ∈ s, then, since sa is not consistent, it is and not contained in any
s′ ∈ S.
Now we construct the canonical model starting from a complete set of formulas, s.
Lemma 5 For every complete set of formulas s, there is a Dal -structure
M = (W , {Sw : w ∈ W},A,R, (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3)) , such that s ∈ W .
Proof :
For every φ ∈ P (s) and every a ∈ At such that sa ∪ {φ} is consistent, we extend
sa ∪ {φ} to a complete set of formulas s′, which exists by lemma 1. So we form
successively sets of formula sets S0, S1,. . . as follows
S0 := {s}
Si+1 := {X : X is a complete extension of Y a ∪ {φ} where Y ∈ Si and φ ∈ P (s)
and Y a ∪ {φ} is consistent}
W :=
⋃
{Si : i ∈ ω}.
Because of remark 4, Vt(s) = Vt(s′) for s, s′ ∈ W . We note Vt(s) = Vt, [t]s = [t]
and ∼s=∼.
For every w ∈ W , Sw = (O,Fw,Pw) is a classical structure where the object set
O is defined as the set of ∼-equivalence classes over Vt.
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• O=def{[t] : t ∈ Vt}
• For every t ∈ O, τ0(w, t) = [t]
• for every n-ary function symbol F ∈ F and for every tuple of terms t1, . . . tn ∈
Vt, τ1(w,F )([t1], . . . [tn]) = [F (t1, . . . tn)]
• Pw is the set of predicates Pw, where for every predicate symbol P of
arity n = |P |, Pw is the predicate defined by (τ1(t1), . . . τ1(tn)) ∈
Pw if and only if P (t1, . . . tn) ∈ w. We set τ2(w,P ) = Pw
• A is the set of action functions a. For every action symbol a of arity |a| =
m, and terms t1, t2, . . . , tm, a(w, t1, t2, . . . , tm) ⊆ W is defined by w′ ∈
a(w, t1, t2, . . . , tm) if and only if wa(t1, t2, . . . , tm) ⊆ w′
• We set τ3(a) = a
Q.E.D.
We show that M is a Dal -structure. By the construction,W is a complete set of
sets.
Lemma 6 τ3(a)(w, τ0(t1), . . . , τ0(tn)) ⊆ R(w). Let be w′ ∈
τ3(a)(w, τ0(t1), . . . , τ0(tn)). Then wa(t1, t2, . . . , tm) ⊆ w′ by construction of
the model. But then w2 ⊆ w′ by lemma 3, from which follows that w′ ∈ R(w).
Truth value τ(w, φ) for formula φ and world w is defined by induction over the
construction of formulas as usual.
In order to show that τ(s, φ) = t if and only if φ ∈ s, we need the following
lemma:
Lemma 7 LetM = (W , {Sw : w ∈ W},A,R, (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3)) be theDal -structure
constructed from a complete formula set w according to lemma 5 and w ∈W .
Then for every action symbol a of arity n, [a]φ ∈ w if and only if
for every tuple of terms t1, t2, . . . , tn and w′ ∈ W , if w′ ∈ τ3(a)(w, t1, t2, . . . , tn,
then φ ∈ w′.
Proof
If φ is ⊥ then this lemma trivially holds because then τ3(a)(w, t1, t2, . . . , tn is empty.
Let φ be different from false.
(⇒): if [a]φ ∈ w then φ ∈ wa and therefore for every w′ ∈ a(w, t1, t2, . . . , tn),
φ ∈ w′ by the definition ofM .
(⇐): Let be |a| = n. Consider wa. We first show that wa ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent.
Assume for the contrary, that wa ∪ {¬φ} is consistent. Since W is a complete set of
formula sets, according to definition 5, there is w′ ∈ W and wa ∪ {¬φ} ⊆ w′. From
this follows wa ⊆ w′, hence w′ ∈ a(w, t(|a|1, |a|2, . . . , |a|)), by the constuction of
M in lemma 5. Since ¬φ ∈ w′ and w′ is complete, φ 6∈ w′, which contradicts the
hypothesis.
Therefore, wa ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent. Therefore there exist formulas
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φ1, φ2, . . . , φk ∈ wa such that ⊢ φ1∧ . . .∧φk → φ from which ⊢ [a](φ1∧ . . .∧φk)→
[a]φ by rule 1 of the logic Dal and therefore ⊢ [a]φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ [a]φk → [a]φ. But
[a]φ1, [a]φ2, . . . , [a]φk ∈ w, and therefore [a]φ ∈ w, by the lemma 2. 2. Q.E.D.
The next lemma concludes our proof.
Lemma 8 For every closed formula φ ∈ P (s),
τ(w, φ) = t if and only if φ ∈ w
The proof is straightforward, by induction over formulas using the lemmata 2 and 7.
Proof of the completeness theorem:
Proof Assume for the contrary that there is a Dal valid formula φ which is not de-
ducible in Dal . Then {¬φ} is a consistent set of formulas, which can be extended
to a complete set of formulae s, by Lemma 1, where ¬φ ∈ s. By Lemma 5, there is
a Dal -structureM = (W , {Sw : w ∈ W},A,R, (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3)) whereW is a com-
plete system of sets and s ∈ W . By Lemma 8, τ(s,¬φ) = t and hence T (s, φ) = f ,
which contradicts the validity of φ. Q.E.D.
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